In this paper we introduce basic notions of a new economic model where preference relations on commodities set are represented by a group action on Euclidean space instead of utility function. Conditions that ensure the existence of individual demand function and a general equilibrium in the setting of exchange economy are examined.
INTRODUCTION
The mathematical modern conception of general economic equilibrium (GEE) is provided by Arrow-Debreu model developed from 1950 (Arrow, Debreu 1954) . This model pictures the economy as a collection of m economic agents who make supply and demand decisions over a nite set of l commodities in order to further their own interests. The general equilibrium research program then studies many properties of economy, particularly the price, choices of agents, individual and aggregated demand functions (Balasko, 1998) . In a pure exchange model, all agents are consumers, and each of them is provided with a preference relation represented by a utility function on R l and an initial endowment e 2 R + l representing his supply o er in the market. Agents are assumed to take as given the market prices of goods. In exchange for his supply, each agent tries to choose the consumption bundle which maximizes his utility given his budget constraint. Such bundle represents the individual demand. Aggregated demand of an economy is the sum of all individual ones, and it is clearly a function of price.
Equilibrium, is by de nition the vector price p 2 R l which makes all markets clear (Supply = Demand). The centerpiece of the subject (GEE) deals with the existence and properties of equilibrium. To ensure an a rmative answer to that question, many conditions on preference relations, and hence on utility functions, are assumed. In summary, it is assumed that preferences are continuous, monotonic and convex, or equivalently, utility functions are di erentiable and concave. When these conditions hold for all agents, the economy is then called neoclassical, and equilibrium prices can be reached (Aliprantis & al, 1989) .
The aim of this paper is to build a new general formulation of consumers' choice where rationality involves not only maximization of preference, but also a well de ned reference of choice, hence our terminology of Economy of Referential Preference (ERP). Although it is clear that this approach can replace, in many instances, the conventional one based on utility function, it is not our main purpose in this paper. In some way, we prouve here that the rationality of economic agents can be treated in a di rent manner than by utility function. In rst section we treat several examples that show the consistency of the group action approach and we explicitly determine the individual demand function. In section two we give a basic de nition of an ERP and we end by proving our main result (theorem 8) establishing the existence of an equilibrium in such economy.
Motivations and examples of referential preference
In this section it is shown by examples that preference relations on commodities set can be represented by a group action on R l . This viewpoint sheds some new light on the economic rationality and conditions of equilibrium. In this work we will touch only a few aspects of group theory and knowledge of elementary matricial calculus is su cient ( see Roman, 2012 , for details and many examples of group action). We begin by a simple example where we can see that indi erence sets of utility function may be represented, or more precisely replaced by group action on R l . Here and subsequently, R + l denotes the positive cone of R l , and R ++ l = x 2 R l /x i > 0; 1 6 i 6 l . As indi erence set I c is arbitrary, this is su cient to conclude that the description of indi erence sets of consumer with given utility function u can be e ciently made by a group actions on R + 2 .
This example gains in interest only if we are able to see how group action becomes useful to de ne a mathematical framework of consumer's theory and general equilibrium.
In other words, we have to de ne a complete preordering relation on R + l and a consumer maximization problem in this new setting.
Actually, let G a topological group and a continuous action of G on R l . Here and subsequently, O x denotes the orbit of x 2 R l under group action. It is easy to check that any group action induces an equivalence relation on R l . Indeed, such equivalence can be obviously de ned as following:
But since this is not su cient to give a totally (complete) preorder on R + l , some other conditions are needed.
Axiom 1 We will denote by v x the unique real v such that we have x 2 O v I l .
Of course this implies that the quotient of X by the equivalence relation induced by the action of group is identi ed with R + .
Clearly, we can deduce a preference relation on X from a group action which veri es axiom 1. Indeed, we say that x is more desirable than y when v x > v y , and they are equivalent if v x = v y . We simply note, that v x = v y 9g 2 G such that g (x) = y x y.
The above axiom is not only a simple mathematical hypothesis, but it has an evident economic meaning which asserts that consumer compares each bundle with a very simple one which is v:I l = v: In many examples, axiom 1 is available for all R + l and the above preference can be extended to all commodities on R + l . When this is not the case we assume that all x 2 R ++ l are preferred to anything on the the boundary. Taking into account this detail, we state the following de nition:
De nition 1.
We say that a preference relation < on commodity set R + l is of reference type, or referential, whenever either 1. It is given by a continuous and globally invariant group action on R + l which satises axiom 1.
2. It is given by a continuous and globally invariant group action on R ++ l which satis es axiom 1, and everything in R ++ l is preferred to anything on the boundary.
Returning to the previous example, where u(x 1 ; x 2 ) = x 1 x 2 , we can see that x 4 y u(x) 6 u(y) v x 6 v y . Actually, u(x) 6 u(y) x 1 x 2 6 y 1 y 2 , but since (v x ; v x ) 2 O x and (v y ; v y ) 2 O y , we have v x Now we will solve a simple problem of consumer's demand with no use of utility function. The group G are the same as in example 1. We then obtain v x (t) = 400t But since g (I) 2 R + l and p 2 R ++ l , we have hp; g (I)i > 0. As hp; g (I)i 0 8g 2 G, continuity of v(g) follows directly from continuity of group action and scalar product on R l .
As w is xed, and w and hp; g (I)i are both positive, then the problem is equivalent to minimizing hp; g (I)i for g 2 G.
In the remainder of this section we assume that referential preferences are given by a subgroup of GL(l; R) which satisfy the following axiom:
Axiom 2
For consumer i 2 I, G i GL(l; R), and the group action's : G i R + l R + l which de nes his preference relations on the commodity space R + l , satis es: there is a unique g i 2 G i ; such that 0 < hI; g i Ii 6 hI; g I l i; 8g 2 G i .
In the following theorem we can see the fundamental role of this group element g i , which is to determine level of satisfaction v max and individual demand function. Then our terminology of``referential preferences``is fully justi ed. Theorem 3. Let e i 2 R + l the initial endowment of consumer i whose preference is de ned by a group G i . Then its demand function is explicitly given by: 
Referential preferences and conditions of equilibrium
We start with an example taken from (Aliprantis & al, 1989 ) to see how our groups' based approach is able to provide same results as the conventional one based on utility function.
Example 3
Let an economy with two commodities and three agents and note that (p 1 ; p 2 ) is the vector price. Utility functions of agents are u 1 (x; y) = xy; u 2 (x; y) = x 2 y and u 3 (x; y) = xy 2 , and their initial endowment are e 1 = 1 2 ; e 2 = 1 1 and e 3 = 2 3 . These assumptions are extracted from example 1.4.10 in Aliprantis and all].
For us, all preferences are given by groups and their actions on R + 2 .
Consumer 1. The group of preference is the matricial subgroup G 1 = t 0 0 Then, we have to nd Max v > 0; such that v p 1 ; t > 0 ; the maximum of v(t) = as the demand of consumer 3.
To calculate the equilibrium price, it su ces to establish the common equilibrium condi- An exchange economy is said to be of referential preferences if:
The consumption set coincides with R + l ;
Each agent i has a non-zero initial endowment, i.e., e i 2 R + l and;
The preference relation i is referential (de nition 1), and satis es axiom 2, for all i 2 T .
The proof of our main result (theorem 8) is based on the following mathematical result.
Theorem 7. Let S = p 2 R l ; p i > 0 for i = 1; 2; ; l; p 1 + p 2 + p l = 1 the set of all strictly positive prices. For a function ( ) = ( 1 ( ); 2 ( ); ; l ( )) from S into R l assume that: i. is continuous and bounded from below;
ii. satis es Walra's Law, i.e., p (p) = 0 holds for each p 2 S;
iii. fp n g S; p n p = (p 1 ; ; p l ) and p k > 0 imply that the sequence f k (p n )g of the k th components of f (p n )g is bounded; and iv. p n p 2 @S with fp n g S imply lim n 1 k (p n )k 1 = 1.
Then, there exists at least one vector p 2 S satisfying (p) = 0:
For proof of theorem 7 we refer the reader to (Aliprantis & al, 1989 , Ch 1).
The main result of this paper is provided below:
Theorem 8.
Every exchange economy of referential preferences has an equilibrium price.
Proof. It is based on Theorem 7. According to theorem 3 and remark 4, the excess demand function in ERP is given by Z: S R l , Z(p) = Third, let now fp n g S; p n p = (p 1 ; ; p l ) and p k > 0. To see why the sequence fZ k (p n g of the k th components of fZ(p n )g is bounded, we consider remark 4 and this expression of demand function: ?1 are nonnegative for all n and tend respectively to p k and (p k ) ?1 , which clearly implies f i (p k n ) is bounded for all i 2 f1; 2; ; mg, and consequently the same holds for fZ k (p n g. Last, it remains to prove that lim n 1 k Z(p n ) k 1 = 1 if p n p 2 @S with fp n g S: Let j 2 f1; 2; ; mg such that p j = 0. Then p j 
Conclusion
In his theory of value, Gerard Debreu wrote:``A state of the economy is a speci cation of the action of each agent ... But these actions are not necessarily compatible with the total resources. Can one nd a price system which makes them compatible? " (Debreu, 1959, p 74) In this work we prove that if, all agents choose their preference in some group setting, and make their choice in compliance with a simple general rule of referential nature, then we can nd a system of price which makes all choices compatible. An in depth work using additional examples will certainly allow us to come across other properties of referential preference and to better grasp its economic interpretations.
